Can duty-drawbacks have a protectionist bias? Evidence from MERCOSUR by Cadot, Olivier et al.
v  Is .as5a'b
POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2523
Can Duty  Drawbacks  Have  Evidence  from Mercosur
suggests  that eliminating duty
a Protectionist Bias  ?  drawbacks  for intraregional
exports  would  lead to
Evidence from Mercosur  increased  counterlobbying
against  protection  of
intermediate products.
Olivier Cadot  Without  the duty drawback,
Jaime de Melo  the common  external  tariff
Marcelo Olarreaga  would have  been  an
estimated  3.5 percentage






















































































































dI  POLICY  RESEARCH  WORKING  PAPER  2523
Summary findings
Duty drawback (or rebate) systems reduce or eliminate  duty drawbacks are granted to exporters that use
the duties paid on imported intermediate goods or raw  imported intermediate goods in their production. This in
materials used in the production of exports. When a firm  turn decreases their incentives to counterlobby against
imports an intermediate product for use in the  high tariffs on their inputs. Indeed, under a full duty
production of an export good, tariff payments on the  drawback regime, tariffs on intermediate goods are
imported intermediate good are either waived (duty  irrelevant to exporters because they are fully rebated. In
drawback) or returned  to the producer once the final  equilibrium, higher tariffs will be observed on these
product is exported  (rebate). These incentive systems are  goods.
often justified on the grounds that they tend to correct  Creating a regional trading bloc alters the incentives by
the anti-trade bias imposed by high tariff levels.  eliminating duty drawbacks on intraregional exports,
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it  which leads to lower tariffs for goods that intraregional
assumes that tariffs are predetermined policy variables; if  exporters use as inputs.
they were, the easiest way to reduce their anti-trade bias  Evidence from Mercosur suggests that eliminating duty
would be to eliminate them. But this is rarely done  drawbacks for intraregional exports would lead to
because existing levels of protection  correspond to a  increased counterlobbying against protection  of
political economy equilibrium difficult to modify in the  intermediate products. Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga
presence of lobbying pressures.  estimate that without this mechanism, the common
Cadot, de Melo, and Olarreaga show that in a political  external tariff would have been 3.5 percentage points  (25
economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are  percent) higher on average.
endogenously chosen through industry lobbying, full
This paper-a  product of Trade, Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the group to study the political
economy of trade policy. The research was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "The
Anti-export Bias of Duty Drawbacks." Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6896,  fax 202-522-1159,  email
address ltabada@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at www.worldbank.org/
research/workingpapers. The authors may be contacted at olivier.cadot@hec.unil.ch, demelo@ibm.unige.ch, or molarreaga
@worldbank.org. January 2001.  (33 pages)
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the series  is to  get the  findings  out quickly,  even if the  presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the authors  and should  be cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are  entirely  those  of the  authors.  They do not necessarily  represent  the view of the World  Bank,  its Executive  Directors,  or the
countries  they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterCan Duty-Drawbacks  have a protectionist  bias?




JEL  classification numbers:  Fll,  F13, F15
Keywords: Duty-drawbacks,  Political-economy  MERCOSUR,  New regionalism,
*We are  grateful  to Gustavo  Bittencourt,  Eric Bond, Caroline  Freund,  Kishore Gawande,  Jaime
Granados,  Bernard  Hoekman,  Pravin  Krishna,  Phil  Levy, John  McLaren,  Garry  Pursell,  Maurice
Schiff, Isidro Soloaga, T.N.  Srinivassan,  David Tarr, Mark Thomas  and participants  at the  "Leitner
Conference on Political  and  Economic Aspects of Regional Integration",  Yale University, April  7-8,
2000 and  a Trade  Seminar  at  the  World Bank for very helpful comments  and  suggestions.  We also
thank  Lili Tabada  for excellent assistance.
tUniversity  of Lausanne,  Switzerland  and  CEPR; email  "Olivier.Cadot@hec.unil.ch";
$University of  Geneva,  Department  of  Political  Economy,  102 bd  Carl  Vogt,  1211 Geneva  4,
Switzerland,  CERDI and  CEPR; email:  "deMelo@ibm.unige.ch".
§The  World  Bank,  1818  H  St.,  Washington,  DC  20433,  USA  and  CEPR,  UK;  email
"molarreaga@worldbank.org".Non-Technical  Summary
Reduction of the anti-export  bias of existing trade policies in developing countries
has been a key component of trade  policy reform packages since the early eighties.  A
quasi universal instrument  to achieve this objective, has been the creation or improve-
ment of duty-drawback systems and temporary  admission regimes. The pervasiveness
of duty-drawback  systems is evident in a sample of 42 developing countries that  have
undertaken  WTO  Trade Policy Reviews, and in which all but  three countries (Benin,
Hong Kong and Singapore) were found to have in place some form of duty-drawback
system.
Duty  drawbacks  (or rebate  systems)  reduce or eliminate the  duties paid  on im-
ported  intermediates  or raw materials  that  are used in  the  production  of exports.
When a firm imports  an intermediate  product for use in the production  of an export
good,  tariff payments  on the  imported  intermediate  are either  waived (duty  draw-
back system) or returned  to the producer once the final product  is exported  (rebate
system).Thus,  the objective  of these mechanisms is to  promote exports  by partially
or fully compensating  exporters for the anti-trade  bias of existing protection,  since
exporters  have access to their imported  inputs  at world prices in spite of the existing
levels of tariff protection.  These incentive systems are often justified  on the grounds
that  they tend to correct the anti-trade  bias imposed by high tariff levels. The prob-
lem with this line of reasoning is that  it assumes that  tariffs are predetermined  policy
variables.  If such was the case, the easiest way of reducing their anti-trade  bias would
be  simply to eliminate them.  The reason why this solution is rarely achieved is that
existing levels of protection correspond to a political-economy equilibrium that  is dif-
ficult to modify in the presence of lobbying pressures. A political economy approach,
such as the one used in this  paper is thus necessary to understand  the rationale  for
such systems.
Our analysis is cast around the many recently-formed regional blocs that  have par-
tially or completely phased out  duty-drawbacks on intra-regional  exports.  This type
of policy change, which we derive endogenously as a response to shifting government
incentives, is likely to trigger a re-balancing of domestic power and incentives.
Using a common agency model of endogenous protection with intermediate goods,
we show  that  duty-drawback  and  rebate  systems  decrease  exporter  incentives  to
lobby against protection  on imported  intermediate  goods. Indeed, under a full duty-
drawback  regime, tariffs on intermediates  are irrelevant  to exporters  since they are
fully rebated.  This leads, ceteris paribus, to higher levels of protection on intermediate
goods heavily used in export industries, penalizing non-exporting users of such goods.
Note that  whether duty-drawbacks  systems are desirable from  a welfare perspective
remains an open question that  we are planning to address in future  research.
iWe then analyze how the formation of a regional  trading bloc alters these incen-
tives. Intra-regional  exporters may be, in terms of profit levels,  better off  than before
since they are now the beneficiaries  of the area's external tariffs, but  at the margin,
their incentive to lobby against intermediate-good  protection rises as duty-drawback
and rebate schemes  are endogenously  eliminated  on intra-regional  exports. In equilib-
rium, this results in a lower  level of external protection for those intermediate goods
that are used heavily  in sectors where  intra-regional  exports are large. Indirect effects
of that  type are at the very least consistent with the reduction in MFN  tariffs that
has accompanied  the "New Regionalism"  that has been observed  by several authors.
We then try to  see if the model's predictions are borne out in the case of the
Common  Market of the Southern Cone (Mercosur)  which  is an interesting case-study
for at least three reasons. First, Mercosur  members all had duty-drawback systems
for exporters in place when they negotiated their Common External Tariff (CET)
in  1994 which will no longer be allowed  for intra-regional trade, once convergence
to the CET is achieved in December  2000. Second, Mercosur  has been identified as
one of the recent regional blocs satisfying the  "New Regionalism"'s  characteristics
that preferential tariff reductions are accompanied  by general  MFN  tariff reductions.
Third, recent work has shown  that industry lobbying  was an important determinant
of Mercosur's  CET.
Our approach to testing the political-economy  hypothesis explained above pro-
ceeds in two steps.  First, we assume that the Mercosur's CET is endogenously  de-
termined through cooperative  bargaining among its members, and there is evidence
that  this was indeed the case as will be discussed later.  Then, using input-output
tables to trace the use of imported intermediates in downstream  industries, we test
whether deviations from the optimal CET  are correlated with the intensity of input
use in downstream  industries. The interest of the exercise  is two-fold. First, it gives
a statistical indication of the magnitude of the lobbying effects attributable to the
elimination of duty-drawback schemes. Second, it provides an indirect test of the
common-agency  model of endogenous  protection, whose empirical predictions have
been the object of some controversy.
We find that  during the negotiations for the Mercosur's CET,  counter-lobbying
against protection of intermediate goods increased following  the elimation of duty-
drawbacks  for intra-regional exports. In the absence of this mechanism,  we estimate
that  Mercosur's  CET would have been on average 3.5 percentage points higher (25
percent higher).
.i.1  Introduction
A key objective of trade reforms initiated  since the early eighties was the reduction of
the anti-export  bias of existing trade policies in developing countries.  For example, a
component  of the World Bank recommendations in their trade loans was the creation
or  improvement  of duty-drawback  systems  and  temporary  admission  regimes  (see
Krueger and Rajapatirana,  1999). The pervasiveness of duty-drawback systems is also
evident in a sample of 42 developing countries having undertaken  WTO Trade Policy
Reviews, for which Michalopoulos (1999) finds that  all but  three  countries  (Benin,
Hong Kong and Singapore) have in place some form of duty-drawback  system.
Duty  drawbacks  (or rebate  systems) reduce or eliminate  the duties  paid on im-
ported  intermediates  or raw materials  that  are used  in the  production  of exports.
When a firm imports  an intermediate  product for use in the production  of an export
good, tariff  payments  on the  imported  intermediate  are  either  waived (duty  draw-
back system)  or returned  to the producer once the final product  is exported  (rebate
system).'  Thus, the objective of these mechanisms is to promote exports  by partially
or fully compensating  exporters  for the anti-trade  bias  of existing  protection,  since
exporters have access to their imported  inputs  at world prices in spite of the existing
levels of tariff protection.
These incentive systems are often justified on the grounds that  they tend, to cor-
rect the  anti-trade  bias  imposed by high tariff levels. The problem with  this  line of
reasoning is that  it  assumes that  tariffs are predetermined  policy variables.  If such
was the  case, the  easiest  way of reducing their  anti-trade  bias would be simply to
eliminate them.  The reason why this solution is rarely achieved is that  existing levels
of protection  correspond to a political-economy equilibrium that  is difficult to modify
in the presence of lobbying pressures. Thus, it is difficult to understand  the rationale
for such systems or to get a complete picture of their incentive effects in the absence
'For  a detailed  description,  and  comparison of, the  functioning  of the  duty  drawback systems  in
Taiwan  (China)  and  Costa Rica, see Wu and  Chuang  (1998).
1of a political-economy approach, which is the one taken in this paper.
Moreover, many recently-formed regional blocs have partially or completely phased
out  duty drawbacks on intra-regional  exports.2 This type of policy change, which we
derive endogenously as a response to shifting government incentives, is likely to trigger
a re-balancing  of domestic power and  incentives (see Lawrence, 1999). This  process
and its effect on the structure  of the regional bloc's external tariffs is the focus of our
analysis.
Using a  common agency model of endogenous protection  (Grossman-Helpman,
1994) with intermediate  goods (Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga,  1997), we show that
duty-drawback and  rebate systems decrease exporter incentives to lobby against pro-
tection  on their  imported  intermediate  goods.  Indeed, under  a full duty-drawback
regime, tariffs  on intermediates  are  irrelevant  to  exporters  since they  are fully re-
bated.  This leads, ceteris paribus, to higher levels of protection on intermediate  goods
heavily used in export  industries, penalizing non-exporting  users of such goods.
The formation  of a regional  trading  bloc alters  these incentives.  Intra-regional
exporters may be, in terms of profit levels, better  off than before since they are now the
beneficiaries of the area's external tariffs, but  at the margin, their  incentive to lobby
against  intermediate-good  protection rises as duty-drawback and  rebate  schemes are
endogenously eliminated  on intra-regional  exports.  In equilibrium, this  results  in a
lower level of external protection  for those intermediate  goods that  are used heavily
in  sectors  where intra-regional  exports  are large.  Indirect  effects of that  type  are
at the very least  consistent  with the reduction  in MFN tariffs that  has accompanied
the  "new regionalism".  Indeed, several authors  (Ethier,  1998a; Lawrence, 1999) have
argued that  one of the  important  characteristics  of the  new wave of regional trade
agreements is that  they are accompanied by simultaneous reductions in MFN tariffs.3
2In the case  of NAFTA,  for example,  Canadian  exporters  to the US market do not necessarily
benefit  from  the  full  duty-drawback,  but  the  level of  drawback  is determined  by  the  mimimun.
amount  between  the  tariff  revenue paid  on their  inputs  and the  tariff revenue they  avoid on  their
exports  by benefitting  from intra-Nafta  free-trade.
3Some authors,  including  Ethier  (1998b) or  Freund  (2000), have argued  that  the  causality  ma}
2If substantial  enough, they might even partially  explain it.
We then  try  to  see if the  model's  predictions  are borne  out  in  the  case of the
Common Market of the Southern  Cone (Mercosur). Mercosur is an interesting case-
study  for at  least  three  reasons.  First,  Mercosur members  all had  duty-drawback
systems  for exporters  in place when they negotiated  their  Common External  Tariff
(CET)  in  1994.  And,  as stipulated  in  Article  12 of mercosur/cmc/dec  No.  10/94,
these will no longer be allowed for intra-regional trade,  once convergence to the  CET
is achieved in  December  2000.  Second, Ethier  (1998a) has  identified  Mercosur as
one of the  recent  regional blocs satisfying the  "New Regionalism"'s  characteristics
that  preferential  tariff reductions  are accompanied by general MFN  tariff reductions
(Estevadeordal  et al.  1999). Third,  recent work (Olarreaga  et al.  1999) has shown
that  industry  lobbying was an important  determinant  of Mercosur's CET.
Our approach  to  testing  the political-economy hypothesis  explained above pro-
ceeds in two steps.  First,  we assume that  the  Mercosur's CET is endogenously de-
termined  through  cooperative bargaining  among its members,  and there  is evidence
that  this was indeed the case as discussed later.  Then, using input-output  tables  to
trace  the  use of imported  intermediates  in downstream industries,  we test  whether
deviations from the optimal CET are correlated with the intensity of input use in down-
stream  industries.  The interest  of the exercise is two-fold. First,  it gives a statistical
indication of the magnitude  of the lobbying effects attributable  to the elimination of
duty-drawback  schemes. Second, it provides an indirect test of the political-support
model of endogenous protection,  whose empirical predictions have been the object  of
some controversy. 4
be  reversed  from  unilateral  (or  multilateral)  liberalization  towards  regional  integration.  Others,
starting with Bhagwati  (1993)  have  expressed  the fear that, on the whole,  the surge in RTAs  is
likely to  diminish the  incentives to engage in multilateral  non-discriminatory  tariff reductions.  For
formal models that  lead to this conclusion, see Levy (1997) and Krishna (1998).  For a comprehensive
review of the  literature  see Panagariya  (2000).
4Our  empirical  results  indirectly  confirm the  prediction  strenght  of both  the  common-agency
model  of Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994) and  the  Nash bargaining  model of Maggi and  Rodriguez-
Clare  (1998).
3To anticipate  our main  result, we find that  during the negotiations  for the Mer-
cosur's CET, counter-lobbying against protection of intermediate  goods increased fol-
lowing the elimation  of duty-drawbacks for intra-regional  exports.  In the absence of
this  mechanism, we estimate  that  Mercosur's  CET would have been on average 3.5
percentage  points higher (25 percent  higher).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a political-
economy model a  la Grossman and  Helpman  (1994) where, in  the presence of im-
ported  intermediate  products  and  duty-drawbacks, there  are incentives to lobby for
exporters.  The characteristics  and implications of a duty-drawback  scheme are stud-
ied and compared with the alternative  of no such incentive scheme. Section 3 focuses
on how incentives to  lobby and  the resulting  endogenously determined  tariff struc-
ture  is likely to  change when two countries enter in a customs union (cu).  Section 4
applies the model to the case of MERCOSUR, where, the formation of the cu  resulted
in a removal of duty  rebates  for exports  to the region.  Section 5 concludes.
2  Tariff  drawbacks  and  lobbying
We explore exporter  incentives to lobby against tariffs on intermediates  products  in a
Grossman-Helpman  (1994) model, 5 to which we add an intermediate  good following
Cadot,  de Melo and  Olarreaga  (1997).6 Consider, then,  a small (price-taking)  open
economy, that  produces 4 traded goods. Goods 0 and 1 are exported (but nevertheless
consumed at home) while 2 and 3 are import-competing.  Goods 0, 1 and  2 are final
goods while 3 is an intermediate  that  is also used in final consumption.  Good 0 is the
5There are other approaches  to endogenous  tariff formation, but as suggested by Helpman (1995),
they all tend to lead to similar predictions. for our purposes, the advantage of the Grossman and
Helpman (1994)  framework  is that it allows  us to derive  estimable reduced-form  equations for tariffs
that  are based on microanalytic foundations.
6The setup is similar to Cadot et aL (1997), but their focus is on explaining the determinants
of protection in the presence of lobbies' rivalry in intermediate and factor markets, whereas here
we explore exporters incentives  in the presence  of tariff drawbacks,  and abstract from factor-market
effects. This simplification  is defensible  if protection is not too high and duty-drawbacks are not a
substantial part of government  tariff revenue.
4num6raire.  It  is produced with labor only under Constant  Returns  to Scale (CRTS);
good 3 (the intermediate)  is produced  with labor and  sector-specific capital;  goods
1 and  2 are produced  with  labor and  sector-specific capital,  and  with  good 3.  The
focus of the model is on the interaction  between sectors  1 (exported final good) and
3 (imported  intermediate).
Technologies in  sectors  1 and  2 are Leontief between intermediate  consumption
and  value added,  with  value-added  being generated  with  labor  and  sector-specific
capital.  Omitting  sector-specific capital,  value-added is an increasing  and  concave
function of labor, fi(fi),  i =  1, 2, and output  is given by
Yi  = min  {fi(ti);  Vi}
where yi is sector i output,  vi is its intermediate  consumption,  and  ai  a fixed xi
input-output  coefficient. The tariff on good i is ti; export goods (0 and  1) are neither
taxed  nor subsidized.
In the three  non-numeraire sectors, the presence of sector-specific capital  implies
diminishing  returns  to  labor  and  hence rents  accruing  to  owners of sector-specific
capital,  who are also the  firms' residual claimants.  These rents are affected by trade
policy: they are the reason for lobbying and the source of political contributions.  The
presence of a good  produced  under  CRTS  with  labor only has  the effect of pinning
down the wage rate, so that  there is no interindustry  rivalry on the labor market which
simplifies considerably  the  model's  structure.7 Moreover, we assume  that  capital
ownership is sufficiently concentrated  for lobbies to disregard the effect of protection
on consumer prices.
Together,  these assumptions  ensure  that  the only source of interindustry  rivalry
are input-output  linkages.  Given this  supply-side  structure,  the  political  line-up is
as follows: sector 3 lobbies for protection,  sector 1 lobbies against  the protection  of
7For an analysis with general  equilibrium effects in the labor market,  and  orders of magnitude  of
its  importance,  see Cadot  et al. (1997).
5sector  3, and  sector 2 lobbies for its  own protection  and  against  the  protection  of
sector 3.  We treat  the game as if lobbies 1, 2 and  3 were acting  as non-cooperative
principals vying for influence over their common agent, the government, following the
common-agency literature.
Consumers have identical tastes represented by a quasi-linear and additive utility
function
U =  Co  +  U(Cl) +  U(C 2) +  U(C3)
where cj stands for the consumption of final good i and the function  u has the usual.
properties.  It follows that,  given that  good 1 is consumed but  also exported  (hence
not protected)  while goods 2 and 3 are imported,  in equilibrium u'(ci)  = pi,  u'(c2) =
P2(1  + t2) and  U'(C 3) =  p3(1  +  t3), where pi is the world price of good i and t1 and  t.
are ad-valorem tariffs.
2.1  Initial  equilibrium
The political  process is as follows. Organized into lobbies, competitive  firms in sec
tors  1, 2 and  3, simultaneously  offer contribution  functions  C1, C2  and  C3  to  the
government,  all conditioned  on a vector of trade-policy  variables.  The trade-policy
variables  are  t2,  t3,  and  a  duty-drawback  system  whereby a fraction  6 of the  tarifi
paid on intermediate  imports  is rebated  to exporters.  Faced with these contributiorL
functions,  the  government  sets t2,  t3,  and  6 so as to  maximize  a weighted average
of social welfare and  income from contributions,  which we will call G. That  is, the
government's  problem is
3
max  G(t2, t3, 6)  =  Ci(t2, t3, 6) + aW(t 2, t3,6)
s.t.  t2 >  0,  t3  >  0,  1 >  6 >  0,
6for some constant  a.  Let
C =  G(t2, t3, 6) + A(1  - 6)
where A  is a Lagrange multiplier.  In a truthful  equilibrium (see Bernheim and Whin-
ston,  1986), the  derivatives  of contribution  functions with  respect  to  t2, t3,  and  6
are  equal  to  the  derivatives of the  sectorial  profit functions.  Using this  property,
equilibrium  conditions are
8t3 - ,  i=1,2  (1)
a7r2  _  aC2  a7r2  8C2 (2)
at2 at2'  a8  a'
*  0,  ti>0,  ti-  =0,  i=2,3  (3)
ati  ati
*  0,  6>0,  6￿=  0,  (4)
1 - 6  >  0,  A > 0,  A(1  - 6) = 0.  (5)
Equations  (1)-(2) are truthfulness  conditions,  while (3)-(5) are Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tions for the government.  Given the technologies postulated,  profit functions can be
written  as
irl(t 3 , 6)  {PI - {P  1P3[(l  +  (1  - 6)t3)]}yl  -W4,
7r2(t2, t3)  =  Vp2(1 +  t2)  - a2p3(1  +  t3)]Y2 - Wf 2,
7t3(t3)  =  p3(1 +  t3)Y3 - Wf3.
7Using the envelope theorem,
at3  =  -(l- 6 )p3  <  a& =  t3p3aYl  >  °,
a7r  =  -P3a2Y2  <  0,  at  =  li2Y2  >  °,  (6)
at 3 t
at  =  P*3Y3  >  °-
Note that  with a full duty-drawback  (i.e. when 6 =  1), producers of good 1 become
indifferent to  the level of the tariff on the intermediate  good, i.e.  a7ri/Ot3  =  0.  This
does not  apply, however, to producers of good 2, who serve the domestic market  and
are consequently  not eligible for the duty-drawback.
As consumers have identical  quasi-linear preferences, social welfare is the sum ol
income and  consumer surplus, income being itself the sum of labor income, industry
profits  and tariff revenue.  The tariff-revenue term is complicated by the presence of
the duty-drawback  scheme, which segments the  intermediate-good  market  between
sector-1  users, who are eligible for it,  and  sector-2 users, who are not.  Given the
availability  of the  scheme, sector-1 firms use only imported  intermediate  goods.  In
order  to avoid a taxonomy of cases, we will assume that  the  domestic output  of the
intermediate  good is not enough to  cover the needs of sector 2 and final users, who
accordingly use a mixture  of home-produced and imported  intermediates  all priced at
p*3(1+t3).  Let m3 =  C3+ClYlY+  a2Y2-Y3  stand for good 3's imports. Net tariff revenue
on good-3  imports is, after deduction of duty-drawback  repayments,  pAt3 (m 3 -Ca1Yl)
Given this,  welfare is:
W  =  we  +  7rj(tj,  t3, 6)  +  72(t 2, t3)  +  7 3(t3)  +  P2t 2m 2 + p3t 3(m 3 - 6 clyl)
3
+  EU(Ci)  - llCl-  P2  (I  +  t2)C2  -P3*(l  +  t3)C3,
i=l
8where £ =  U0ti.  Welfare terms are thus
P2Y2 + p 2m2  + P*,t2mn +  U'(C2)c2P2 - p2C2 - p2(l  +  t2)cP2p at 2
=  p2t2m2 < 0  (7)
for protection  in sector 2, and
at  =3Y3  - p3*(I  - 6)ajyj  - P3a2Y2  +  at[3t 3(m3 - balyl)]
±  U'(C 3)C3p3  - p3C3 - p3(1  +  t 3)C3p3
for protection  in sector 3. But note that  c3 + alYi + a2Y2  =  y3 + M3, and that
atp3t3(m3-  alyi)]  =  p3 Lm3  - baly  + t3 m-  at)]
=  A)  [M3 - 5alY 1 + t3 m3-  al  )]
=  p  [M3 - Saly,  + t3 {mI  - 6aia-[_(1a  -
M3  3ma  - bCelyl  +  t3[mI  +  5(1  - 6)a2y']]
where  y'  is  the  own-price derivative  of supply  in sector  1.  Combining  these  and
rearranging  slightly gives
aw  = p*3t3[m'  + 3(1 - 6)aY2]y  (8)
Finally, the welfare effect of the duty-drawback  at rate 6 is
as  as  +  0[P*3ta(m 3 - balYl)]  =  0-  (9)
The  absence of a  welfare effect of the  duty-drawback  reflects the  fact  that  it  is  a
pure transfer  entailing  no welfare loss, since it  affects neither  the  consumer price of
9good 1 nor its producer price, but only the price of an input  in a Leontief production
function.8 Combining (6) with  (7), (8), and  (9) gives
8G  A  P  (Y2  +  at 2 m'),  (10')
<it=  P3  (Y3  b1a- IYI-  2Y2 + at 3 [m',  + 4(1-  6)CY])  (11)
OG*
06  =  P3t3alYl  (12)
The function  G is globally concave in t2 and  t3,  so the second-order condition  holds
for these instruments.  We will assume in addition  that interior solutions hold for both
instruments  since otherwise the whole problem of endogenous protection  would be-
come irrelevant.  By contrast,  (12) is clearly nonnegative no matter  what,  and strictly
positive whenever t3  >  0 (the duty-drawback  is irrelevant if t3 is zero).  Therefore in
equilibrium there is full drawback, i.e. 6* =  1. Using this condition  to simplify (11),
the first-order condition for t3 reduces to
Y3 - C2Y2  + at 3m3  =  0,
or
3*  V3iaE2Y  (13)
Finally, setting  (10) equal to zero and solving for t2 gives
2=  -_  I  (14)
Together,  t*, t* and  E* =  1 define the  initial  (pre-RTA) equilibrium. 9 Recall that  sector
8Note  that  this  implies  that  duty-drawbacks  cannot  be justified  on  welfare grounds  under  the
assumptions  in this  paper.  Panagariya  (1992) provides a more general  model where  duty-drawbacks
have ambiguous effects on welfare.
9Note  that  we would have obtained  similar optimal  tariffs had  we assume  that  the  government
101 is the export sector and that  sector 2 (along with sector 3) is an import competing
sector.  Hence sector 2 is not  eligible for a duty-drawback.
Compared  to  a  model with  no intermediates,  what  is new here is the  negative
term  involving the  output  of sector 2 in the  numerator  of (13).  This  term  reflects
counter-lobbying  by producers  in  sector  2 against  protection  in  sector  3,  because
protection  raises  the  price of the  intermediate  good and  consequently  hurts  their
profits.  However, sector  1, is not  active in this  counter-lobbying,  because the  full
duty-drawback  shelters it from the cost of intermediate-good  protection.  The absence
of counter-lobbying  by sector 1, because it benefits from full duty-drawback,  tends
ceteris paribus, to  raise the equilibrium level of protection in sector 3 (and  therefore
to hurt  sector 2 and  consumers).  Thus,  duty-drawbacks have a protectionist  bias. 10
Note,  incidentally,  that  the  duty-drawback  scheme creates  intra-industry  trade
even under  perfect  competition.  The reason is that  producers  of good 1 will always
choose to export all their output if doing so makes them eligible for the duty-drawback
(encouraging  exports  is indeed the scheme's objective)  while domestic  consumption
of good  1 will be  entirely covered by imports.  A country having a  duty-drawback
scheme will then both  export  and import good 1.
3  Customs  Union  and  duty-drawbacks
Suppose now that  country A forms a Customs Union (cu)  with the country absorbing
sector I's exports,  country B, which then becomes its partner  country. This situation
will not be typical of most RTAs among, say sub-saharan  African countries, since they
trade  small amounts of manufactures.  But such a situation  corresponds largely to the
MERCOSUR case, at least between Argentina and Brazil, since they were both able to
and  the lobby engaged in Nash bargaining over contributions as in Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare
(1998) instead of the common-agency  game of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
I'Note  that  the  equilibrium  tariffs  reflect tariff  escalation,  in the  sense that  intermediate  goods
have  higher  levels of  protection  than  consumer  goods.  The  presence  of duty-drawbacks,  however
reduces the  extent  of tariff escalation  by increasing  the tariffs on intermediate  goods.
11export substantial  amount of manufactures to each other (see Yeats, 1998). It would
also apply to countries  in Asia that  have duty-drawbacks  and  have the  potential  to
export substantial  amounts  of manufactures  to each other.
Suppose then  that  the  governments  of A and  B  agree on  an  efficient solution
for the  CET,  and  then  bargain  over how they share  the benefits  of cooperation  via
monetary  transfers  ("shallow integration"  in the terminology of Cadot et al., 1999).1"
In this setup, let us first examine under which conditions duty-drawbacks would be
eliminated for intra-regional exports,  and if so what  are the consequences for external
tariffs.
3.1  Elimination  of  duty-drawbacks  after  CU  formation
Article 12 of MERCOSUR  declaration cmc/dec No. 10/94 stipulates  that  intra-regional
exporters can no longer benefit from duty-drawbacks.  To explain Mercosur's decision
let us write  the CU first order  condition  for the optimal level of duty-drawback-for
intra-regional  trade.' 2 In view of the application  in section 4, we use superscript  M
(for MERCOSUR) to denote the customs union.  Recalling that  country B  absorbs all
of country  A exports  of good 1 and using (12):
8GM  =G  8GB  = pT 3aA  A_  -a  B  *  81/  (15)
86  b-  =  6  ±  P--  ~  iI1l&  (1
where GM is the CU's objective function (given by the sum of A's and  B's  objective
function)  and  ri is the  CET in sector i.  The first term  in  (15) is as before the gain
for the government  of country A of imposing a  duty-drawback.  The second term  is
I 'Shallow  integration' boils down  to setting up the problem  as if a common  agency  was  maximizing
the sum of member-country  government's  welfare functions,  whereas under  'deep integration',  there
is a  single agency  in  charge  of trade  policy that  takes  into  account  union-wide  lobbying,  so that
unlike shallow integration,  country  characteristics  are aggregated.
121t could  be argued  that  allowing for duty-drawbacks  within  a CU makes little  economic sense
as  this  may  create  incentives  for trade  cross-hauling.  The  objective  here  is to show  under  which
conditions  it may  also make little  political-economy sense.
12now the  loss for country  B  in terms of tariff revenue of allowing exporters  in  A to
benefit  from duty-drawbacks.  Indeed,  the  existence of a  duty-drawbacks  in  intra-
regional  trade  shifts  outwards  the export  supply of exporters  in  A, which reduces
tariff revenue for country B  (as it diverts from rest-of-the world imports).
Using (6) and  noting that  ayjA/la  =  a27rAl/a,9r1, the right-hand-side  of (15) is
always negative, and therefore at the optimum there are no duty-drawbacks (EM  =  0),
if:
aB  >  I  +  T,  (16)
where EA stands for the price-elasticity of supply of good 1 in country A. Thus, if the
weight given to  social welfare in country  B's  objective function  is sufficiently high,
then  duty-drawbacks  will be  eliminated.  The reason  is that  the gains  in  terms  of
contributions  by producers  of good 1 in A are not  sufficient to  compensate for the
loss in terms of tariff revenue in B.
Taking as an example the average tariff in MERCOSUR which is around  14 percent,
and assuming an average price-elasticity of supply around 1, 16 implies that  aB has to
be larger than  8 for duty-drawbacks to be completely eliminated.  Note that  if import
demand  functions are non-concave, the second-order condition for the  government's
problem requires aB to be larger than  1. Estimates of a for the United States in the
1980s yield values between 50 and  88 (see Goldberg  and Maggi,  1999).  Given that
MERCOSUR has eliminated duty-drawbacks for intra-regional trade, one can infer that
the  constraint  in  (16) was satisfied.  The  implications for CET levels are studied  in
the next  section.
133.2  CET  after  duty-drawback  elimination
Several trade  patterns  can be envisaged when the  CU is formed.  Since we are in-
terested  in situations  where lobbying takes place, we assume that  exporters of good
1 in  A sell in  a protected  market  in  B.  This will be the  case, if the  following two
assumptions  are met.
First,  let us assume that there is protection in sector 1, so that  we can concentrate
on  the  conditions  when it  will be  profitable for A's  producers  to  sell in  B.  Since
duty-drawbacks  are eliminated for intra-regional  trade,  this  creates  an incentive for
exporters  to  re-direct  their  production  from the region to  the  rest-of-the  world.  In
such a  situation  the  increase in counter-lobbying will not  occur.  In order  to  avoid
this,  we need to  assume that  producers  always find it more profitable to sell within
the  regional  market  with  protection  and  paying duties  on intermediate  purchases,
than  selling on the  world market  at the  world market  price,  but  not  paying duties
on intermediate  purchases.  Letting r1 be the CET on good 1, as before, this requires
that:
p  1  +  T[1  _-CAp3(1  +  T3)]  >  P  ap3)
which simplifies to:
Assumption  1:  Ti  >  P3T3
Assumption  1, which  is similar  to  the  expression  determining  whether  firms  will
sell in markets  protected  by rules of origin requirements  (see e.g.  Krueger,  1993), guar-
antees  that  selling  in the  market  protected  by  the  CET is more  profitable  than  selling
in  the  world  market  even  if it involves  forsaking  the  benefit  of the  duty-drawback.
Second,  we suppose  that  A  and  B's  combined  output  in sector  1 is not  enough  to
serve  the  entire  cu  demand  at  the  equilibrium  price.  Again,  this  situation  is most
representative  of  RTAs among  developing  countries,  at  least  among  countries  that  do
14not differ too much in size (like Argentina and Brazil).  That  is, letting cA  + cB be the
cu  consumption of good 1 at price p,(l  + r1) and  yA  +  yB  the cu  output,  we assume:
Assumption  2:  cj t +  cB > yj  + y1
Thus,  after  the  cu  is formed, firms in  sector  1 sell in a  protected  market  (the
partner  country's),  which was not  the  case before.  This  gives them  a direct  bene-
fit.  However, they  are no longer eligible for the duty-drawback  scheme so that  they
become  sensitive to  the  rate  of protection  of the  intermediate  good.  Through  the
truthfulness  restriction,  the degree of their sensitivity, given by the derivative of their
profit function with  respect  to the  CET  in sector 3, i.e.  r3, determines the  intensity
of their  counter-lobbying.13
Turn  now to  the  determination  of the  CET  in  sector 3.  Recalling  that  duty-
drawbacks  are disallowed for intra-regional  trade,  i.e., that  6M  =  0, the first  order
condition  to the  CET  problem in the intermediate  sector, is given by:
aGM  qGA  0GB
Tr 3 T3  (13
*A  (yA_  eAy  A _  aAy A +  aAr 3m A)  (18)
+  p~(YB  - CZ  - B_a cyB  + a  B7MmBI) =0  (19) + P3 (3  1  Y1  -2  Y2  +  B3m)=°(9
Protection  for sectors producing final goods would be given by an expression identical
to (19), except that  it would exclude the element that  captures  counter-lobbying on
intermediate  products.
Return  to  (19).  To  simplify, but  also  in view of empirical  tractability  for the
13Note that  both  assumptions  would not  be  necessary,  if we assumed  that  trade  took  place  in
differentiated  products,  which is probably  a  better  approximation  for trade  in most  manufactures,
since then  it would always pay  to sell in both  markets and  it would always pay to obtain  protection
(a tariff would raise the price of the  domestic substitute),  though  one would have to factor  in terms-
of-trade  effects.  In any event,  a more general  formulation  would be  consiberably  more cumbersome
to develop.
15application  that  follows, assume identical  price effects on import  demand  for both
countries  in  sector 3,  i.e.  that  mn'  =  mBi  =  i  <  0.  Also, choose units  so that
Y  +  3=  1.  The  assumption  of identical  price effects is motivated  by  lack of
detailed information on import  demand elasticities at a disaggregated level, whereas
the normalization  assumption  is to avoid 'size' effects in the estimation.  Let  tA  and
t3  stand  respectively for the levels of tariffs satisfying (13) for the home and partner
countries respectively.
Then solving (19) for T3,  and rearranging using (13) yields the expression that  will
be used in the estimation  below:
a A  A  B  1  BB
T3 =  AaA  tA  W  +  +0  (20)
a  +aB  3  aA + aB3  +  (aA + a+  Z
where 01A  =  (1 -9)  = y/(y"  + yP) is country A's share in the output  of good j  and
Z3i =  I  2Y
is the share  of good 3's output  in country  Z  used as an intermediate  in sector 1.
Expression  (20) indicates  that  the  CET  is given by  a  weighted  average of the
existing  optimal  tariffs  in both  countries  (these are the  first  two elements  on the
RHS  of (20) plus  a third  term  that  denotes the increase in counter-lobbying  by the
export sector against  tariffs on the intermediate  good due to the elimination of duty-
drawbacks on intra-regional  trade.  The last term on the RHS  of (20) is negative since
y  <  0,  so its  presence  reduces the  value  of the  CET.  Note  also that  the  increase
in  counter-lobbying would still be present  in (20) if one did  not  impose a  common
import  demand  in each member country.14
" 4One can show that  if government's  objective  when setting  tariffs is to maximize  tariff  revenue,
then  the  CET would have been given by an  expression similar to the one in (20), i.e., r3*  =  1/2(tA +
tB)  - l1/p(3z3  + 93zB).  The difference is that  the elimination  of duty-drawbacks  would have led
to  a higher  CET rather  than  lower.  Note that  it would not be possible to endogenously explain  the
existence  of duty-drawbacks  in the  pre-cu  equilibrium  if governments maximized  tariff revenue.
16Note that  when substituting  ti,  i e A, B in (20), we are implicitly assuming that,
when lobbying the  government,  lobbies do not  take into  account  the  second-round
effects of the adjustment  in tariffs on their production levels.  This assumption is not
only probably  closer to  reality than  the  alternative  which would take  second-round
effects into account,  but  also it  is  the  only  possible  assumption  in  our  empirical
application  on Mercosur.'5 Most importantly,  to  be able to  substitute  the  existing
tariffs will avoid excluding from the empirical analysis some important  determinants
of the tariff levels which cannot be directly measured.
To recapitulate,  the simple political-economy model developed here shows that,  if
there is a possibility for exporters to obtain a duty-drawback, they will lobby to obtain
the full drawback (which is what is usually observed), and that  duty-drawbacks tend
to raise the equilibrium rate  of protection on intermediate  goods. More importantly
for our  purposes,  the model  shows that  under  plausible conditions,  a cu  will alter
lobbying incentives, leading to pressures to eliminate duty-drawbacks  and to reduce
the external protection  on intermediate  goods.
4  Application  to  Mercosur
We use Mercosur data  to check whether the model's predictions  are consistent with
observed outcomes.  Beyond data  issues and  the reasons stated  in the  introduction,
there are at least two practical  reasons for our choice. First, steps towards putting  in
place a CET  have gone much faster than in other recent RTAs;  recall that  the agreement
was signed in  1991 and  that  the  CET  came into effect in 1995. Second, Mercosur is
the only cu  whose members previously had  duty-drawbacks and which substantially
eliminated  barriers on internal  trade.  We discuss first  data  and  econometric issues,
then turn  to  results.
15This is because  to  our  knowledge there  exists  no disaggregated  production  data  available  for
Mercosur  members after  1994, and  Mercosur's  CET was implemented  in 1995.
174.1  The  empirical  model
To estimate  the effect of eliminating duty-drawbacks on the level of Mercosur's  CET,
we estimate  a stochastic  version of (20) on a cross-section of tariffs. To estimate  the
expression, we need to  calculate the third term in that  expression which requires in-
formation  on input-output  relations and on production at a fairly disaggregated level
(isIc  4 digit-level which includes 80 sectors).  A table  describing the  characteristics
of the 80 sectors  used in the estimation  is provided in the data  appendix.  The only
Mercosur members for which industrial  data  was available at this  level of disaggre-
gation  were Argentina and  Brazil.  Given that  together  they represent  more than  85
percent  of Mercosur production  in any sector at the 3 digit  IsIc classification level,
the exclusion of Uruguay and Paraguay from the empirical analysis should not unduly
affect our results.16 Moreover, in their study of the determination  of Mercosur's CET,
Olarreaga and Soloaga (1998) concluded that  Brazil's political lobbying variables per-
formed as well in explaining  variations in Mercosur's  CET on their  own as those of
the four members together.
In section 2, goods 1 and 2 were pure final goods whereas 3 only was usable both
in final consumption  and  as an intermediate  input.  Now, let all goods be usable as
final goods and as intermediates  in the production  of other goods.  We need then  to
rewrite  slightly the coefficient z>.  The total  demand for good j  as an intermediate  in
the production  of all other goods k (k =  1, ..., 80), is Ek ackyk,  where a 3k  is it's  per
unit requirement  in the  production of good k; thus,
and the share of good j's  Mercosur output  used as an intermediate  in the production
l6See Olarreaga  and  Soloaga (1998).
18of other goods in the Mercosur is
ZM  =  E  i  (21)
i=A,B
where 9  is  's  share  in the  Mercosur's output  of j.  The higher is ZjM,  the stronger
is the counter-lobbying against protection of j,  and consequently, in accordance with
(19) the lower is, ceteris paribus, the level of good j's  equilibrium external tariff under
the CET.
At  the  4 digit  ISIC classification level, Mercosur's  CET  is  censored from above
at its  upper  limit of 20 percent  (four sectors reach this  upper  bound  at this  level of
disaggregation).  To allow for censoring, we estimate  (20) using a Tobit  model; i.e.
T^ if rT < 20
20  if rT*  > 20
and  =  A  B t A  +  tB  +  +  M
aA  a  j  a;A +aBJ  ,t(aA±aB)  3
=  itj  +  2 2 t± +  /3  Zj  +  E  (22)
where subscript j stands for a sector, j  =  1, ...80, ej is the error term, and the expected
signs are Il3  > 0,  /2  >  0 and /3  <  0 .
In estimating  (22), no constraints  are imposed on the values taken by /31  and  /2,
whereas the  model  suggests /3  =  1 - #2.  The alternative  then  is to  estimate  this
constrained  version of (22) by taking  tO (for example) to  the  left-hand-side  of the
equation.  Thus, the equation  to be estimated  becomes:
T*-tA  =  /2  (tjB-t  0)  + /3  4 + e  (23)
where the expected signs are as before. The advantage of (23) is that  it is no longer
19censored and can therefore be estimated by OLS (or by weighted least squares to
control for potential group data heteroscedasticity).
As discussed  in Olarreaga, Soloaga and Winters (1999), tariffs tend to be deter-
mined at the  tariff line level and not at the industry level." 7 This implies that  if
the error is determined at the tariff line level and the number of tariff lines in each
industry is not the same (as can be observed  in the table in the data appendix the
number of tariff lines varies from 1 in ISIC 3131 to 501 tariff lines in ISIC 3511),
then the variance of the error term at the industry level  will be negatively correlated
with the number of lines in each industry, reducing the efficiency  of our estimates.
To correct for this potential heteroscedasticity,  each observation  at the industry level
needs to be weighted by the number of tariff lines in each industry (i.e. multiplied
by the square root of the number of tariff lines in each industry).
However,  a problem with the above correction is that  it assumes that the errors
at the tariff line level are independently  distributed. If observations  within the same
industry share a common unobserved determinant, then the above correction may
reintroduce some heteroscedasticity. To test for this possibility, we follow  Dickens
(1990)  and when necessary,  we apply the correction  he suggests  which yields asymp-
totically efficient  estimates.' 8
The data  appendix describes data  sources and provides a table with the data
used in the estimations. The CET is the one negotiated in Ouro Preto in  1994 by
Mercosur members. Tariffs  or Argentina and Brazil are 1994 external official  tariffs
(corresponding to an FTA situation  as by then more than 95 percent  of their internal
trade  was free of tariffs).  Trade data  is the average of 1993, 1994 and  1995 whereas
production  data  correspond  to the industrial  census of 1985 in Argentina  and Brazil
17If not we would  not observe variation in tariff levels  within industries.
18The test consists in verifying whether the error term of the weighted regression is correlated
with the number of tariff lines in each industry. If this is the case, then one estimates consistently
the variance of the common  and individual  error components  by regressing  the error of the weighted
estimate on a constant and on l/nj,  where nj is the number of tariff lines in industry j.  To obtain
asymptoticlly efficient estimates, one re-weighs  the observations  at  the industry level using these
variance estimates.
20updated  to 1994 using industrial  production  indices provided by UNIDO.
4.2  Did  counter-lobbying  increase  in  Mercosur?
Table 1 reports  results of the estimation  of (22) in the first column and of (23) in the
second column.  In both  regressions, the coefficients have the expected sign and  are
statistically  significant at the 99 percent level." 9 The regressors "account for" around
60 percent  of the cross-sectorial variation in Mercosur's CET.
While it may be stretching  the power of the model to interpret  the values of /3,  /2
in terms of welfare weights, it is nonetheless worthwhile to note the following. Uncon-
strained estimates  suggest that  Argentina and Brazil give relatively similar weights to
social welfare in their objective function.  However, the constrained estimates  suggest
that  Argentina's  trade  policy authorities  are significantly more concerned by social
welfare than  Brazil's  trade  policy authorities  (VA/^aB  =  1.27).  These estimates  are
consistent with the fact that,  on average, Argentina's  pre-CET average tariff is lower
than  Brazil's  (see sample data in the appendix).
For our purposes, however, the most important  result is that  in both regressions,
the sector's share of sales to other sectors enters with a negative sign, suggesting that,
indeed, as predicted by a political-economy approach to the determination  of the  CET
intermediate  goods producing sectors get less protection.
The results seem sufficiently promising to use our estimates  to calculate the mar-
ginal effect of counter-lobbying on the  CET  from the coefficient estimates  in table  1.
The results  of this  exercise are shown in table  2. Let a z indicate  the mean value of
zM  in the sample, and  /3 the estimated  marginal effect of regressor zM,  whose value
is given in table  1.  Then the change in the value of the  mean value of the  CET,  AT
is given by: AT =  z. In our sample z = 0.68.
" 9Note that  the negative  coefficient on zM also implies that  government's  objective  is closer to the
political-economy function  used in this  paper  than  one where government's  maximise tariff  revenue
(see footnote  14).
21A slight complication arises from the presence of censoring in our tobit  estimate
since the  marginal  effects should  not  include  observations for tariffs on  the  upper
bound,  since these  tariffs  could not  be higher  in  the  absence of counter-lobbying
given the structure  of the tariff schedule. Therefore we need to weigh our estimated
coefficients in the  tobit  regressions by the  average probability  of each observation
being in the uncensored region.  Given the low degree of censoring (5 percent)  in our
data,  this probability  is relatively high and equal to 0.98. Thus, for the tobit equation
our estimated  marginal effect is AF  =  0.98:iz.
Table  2 reports  results  of the  importance  of counter-lobbying  in  terms  of per-
centage points  reductions  in the average CET  for our different estimations  using this
procedure  and  one standard  deviation  below and  above the  estimated  coefficient. 20
The total  CET  reduction  associated  with counter-lobbying varies from 2.2 to 4.4 per-
centage points  (the  average CET  value in this  sample is 13.9%).  Hence, according
to  the model,  in the absence of counter-lobbying,  Mercosur's  CET  would have been
between 16.1% and  18.3%. Taking the constrained  estimates  as reference, the  aver-
age  CET would have been 3.5 percentage  points  higher in the  absence of increased
counter-lobbying on intermediates'  tariffs.
Table  3 indicates  the  top  five and  the  bottom  five industries  where  after  the
elimination  of duty-drawbacks,  counter-lobbying has led to the  largest and  smallest
reductions  in tariffs, respectively.  The largest  increase in counter-lobbying on inter-
mediate  products  tariffs occured in industries  3699 (non-metallic mineral products),
3692 (cement, lime and  platter),  3610 (pottery,  china and  earthware),  3620 (glass)
and 3691 (structural  clay).  These tend to  be sectors that  are heavily used as inter-
mediates in other  sectors production  and therefore  which where more inclined to be
subject to increase counter-lobbying on their tariffs. The smallest increase in counter-
lobbying occured  in industries  3220 (wearing apparel),  3231 (tanneries  and  leather
20To give an example, the middle entry in row 1 of table 2, -3.0  is obtained as follows:  -3.0  =
(0.98)(-4.51)(0.68)
22finishing), 3233 (leather products),  3240 (footwear) and 3112 (dairy products).  These
tend to be sectors which sell a little share of their output  as input to other sectors.  In
non-metallic mineral products  (3692), the tariff could have been 5.4 percentage points
higher in the absence of increased  counter-lobbying, which represents more than  50
percent of the actual  CET.  At the other end of the spectrum, for wearing apparel,  the
fall in tariff was a low 0.1 percentage points, which represents around  0.5 percent  of
the actual  CET.
5  Concluding  remarks
This  paper  used a  political-economy framework to  study  the  implications  of duty-
drawback  schemes (promoted  by the  World Bank  in many  developing countries  as
a  mechanism mitigating  the anti-trade  bias of existing tariffs) for the incentives of
export  industries  to  lobby against upstream  tariffs on imported  intermediates.  In a
model where duty-drawback  schemes are jointly  determined  with tariffs as part  of a
political-economy equilibrium, we show that  they reduce counter-lobbying incentives,
leading, ceteris paribus, to higher tariff rates on imported  intermediates  used heavily
in export industries.
Moreover, we showed that  the  formation  of a cu  will endogenously lead to  the
elimination of duty-drawbacks for intra-regional exports.  This re-creates an incentive
for counter-lobbying by users of intermediate goods, resulting in lower external tariffs
on intermediate  products,  thereby  formalizing a channel  through  which the  "new"
regionalism may, in the  terminology of Bhagwati,  be a stepping stone rather  than  a
stumbling  block in the move towards greater integration  of the world economy.
The model's predictions  were tested  and confirmed in the case of Mercosur.  Our
estimates  suggest that  the  CET would have been  on average  3.5 percentage  point
higher (25 percent)  in the absence of the increased counter-lobbying on intermediate
products  associated with the elimination of duty-drawbacks for intra-regional exports.
23Thus, the mechanism described above may partly explain the decline in external tariffs
associated with the "new regionalism" defined by Ethier and Lawrence. Although our
results  could no doubt  have been derived from alternative  political-economy models,
they also provide indirect vindication of the empirical implications of common-agency
(and Nash-bargaining)  models of trade  protection.
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28Table 1: Estimating  the increase in counter-lobbying'





zM  -4.51  -5.19
(1.20)**  (1.28)**
tB  - tA  .44
(.07)**
Constant  7.58  4.47
(1.09)**  (1.00)**
R2-adj."  0.68  .52
#  obs.  80  80
'.All estimations have used Dickens  (1990) procedure  to correct  for group data heteroscedasticity.
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. * stands for significance  at the 95 percent level and
at the 99 percent level.
bFor the tobit regression the R2 is calculated according to Mc Veall and Zimmermann (1994)
best predictor.
Table 2: Measuring the reduction in the CET  due to counter-lobbyinga
. b  -c  Zm  d Zmin  Zrnax
Tobit:  eq.  (22)  -2.2  -3.0  -3.8
Const.:  eq.  (23)  -2.7  -3.5  -4.4
'See text on how entries were computed. Values  are expressed in percentage points.
'One standard deviation below f3.
cAt  p3.
dOne  standard deviation above /33.Table 3:  Top and Bottom  5 tariff reductions due to increased
counter-lobbyinga
ISIC  CET  (r)  Fall in T
Non-metallic mineral prod.  (3699)  9.4  -5.4
Cement, lime and  plaster (3692)  4.0  -5.3
Top 5  Pottery,  earthenware  (3610)  17.0  -5.2
Glass and glass prod.  (3620)  12.7  -5.2
Structural  Clay prod.  (3691)  11.7  -5.2
Wearing apparel  (3220)  19.9  -0.1
Leather finishing (3231)  9.5  -1.1
Bottom  5  Products  of Leather (3233)  19.5  -1.1
Footwear (3240)  20.0  -1.2
Dairy prod.  (3112)  14  -1.3
aValues  of tariff reductions are expressed in percentage points and are computed using the con-
strained estimates.Data  Appendix
Tariffs.
Common external  tariff data  and external tariffs were provided by the MERCO-
SUR secretariat  (official tariffs for 1995, announced in December  1994). Tariff data
are disaggregated at the 8-digit level of the harmonized system (9119 items) and were
converted to  the 6-digit level by simple averages. To filter the data  from the 6-digit
harmonized system to the 4-digit isic  classification we used a table provided by Jerzy
Rozanski from the World Bank.
Trade  data.
The sources are national  accounts (COMTRADE)  in US dollars.  Data were aver-
aged for 1993-95 and disaggregated at the 6-digit level of the harmonized system.  To
convert them  to ISIC 4-digit we used the same filter as for tariff data.
Industrial  data.
The sources are the industrial  censuses of Argentina and Brazil in 1985 for produc-
tion data, and the GTAP database  for Argentina and Brazil in 1995 for input-output
coefficients.  The industrial  data  at  the 4-digit level was converted into  1994 values
using  a production  index  at the  3-digit level available at  UNIDO.  Given that  pro-
duction data  is denominated in domestic currency we converted them  to 1993-95 US
dollar values with the  ratio of the average nominal GDP in Manufacture  in  1993-95
(from National  Accounts) to the total  value added calculated from census figures (to
which we also apply the production index).  The data are disaggregated into 80 sectors
corresponding to  the 4-digit ISIC level.  To convert the input-output  data  from the
GTAP  classification to the ISIC one, we used the tables provided by GTAP manuals.
31Sample  Data
ISIC  CET  (r)  tA  tB  zM  #  lines
3111  9.2  4.2  7.9  0.260  77
3112  14.0  6.9  19.9  0.245  23
3113  12.6  6.9  9.4  0.312  63
3114  13.7  4.9  16.6  0.287  19
3115  9.4  4.0  7.2  0.397  47
3116  10.0  4.7  9.3  0.297  34
3117  16.7  7.8  20.7  0.287  13
3118  13.9  5.8  11.0  0.459  14
3119  16.2  8.0  14.6  0.288  13
3121  13.7  7.4  12.7  0.300  31
3122  11.0  5.0  11.2  0.315  2
3131  20.0  5.0  20.0  0.375  1
3132  18.0  7.0  18.1  0.278  7
3133  16.0  5.8  7.3  0.507  3
3134  19.9  7.0  18.6  0.334  9
3140  18.7  8.9  19.1  0.375  6
3211  16.2  12.8  14.4  0.752  389
3212  19.3  18.6  19.0  0.729  64
3213  18.0  15.0  16.0  0.686  18
3214  18.8  14.3  18.8  0.769  27
3215  18.0  10.0  16.0  0.813  12
3219  15.5  13.0  14.7  0.646  26
3220  19.9  19.7  19.9  0.029  257
3231  9.5  3.0  5.9  0.218  21
3233  19.5  18.7  19.5  0.225  20
3240  20.0  20.0  20.0  0.236  14
3311  9.8  9.8  6.7  0.575  25
3312  10.8  11.0  10.6  0.532  5
3319  9.8  9.1  8.8  0.566  8
3320  18.0  14.9  17.2  0.574  23
3411  10.8  13.1  7.0  0.784  104
3412  16.0  15.0  11.8  0.784  8
3419  13.8  15.0  11.4  0.791  11
3420  9.9  14.8  8.2  0.766  27
3511  7.5  7.0  6.9  0.848  501
3512  4.5  5.5  5.2  0.883  27
31513  12.4  10.4  12.0  0.838  114
3521  14.0  9.8  14.0  0.840  12
3522  6.6  5.5  5.4  0.785  60
3523  16.7  13.4  13.1  0.816  32
3529  10.0  10.4  8.3  0.833  76
3530  2.8  2.2  6.6  0.730  23
3540  1.7  6.3  3.0  0.971  8
3551  14.8  14.4  14.0  0.838  13
3559  14.4  11.9  14.8  0.823  36
3560  17.3  14.3  18.6  0.824  50
3610  17.0  12.3  15.3  1.017  14
3620  12.7  11.1  12.0  1.005  58
3691  11.7  9.8  9.4  1.004  14
3692  4.0  5.0  0.0  1.029  8
3699  9.4  10.3  5.6  1.039  56
3710  11.6  10.6  9.9  0.939  163
3720  8.2  8.4  5.9  0.964  152
3811  17.4  15.0  17.2  0.762  80
3812  17.3  15.0  17.3  0.939  3
3813  14.3  14.3  16.2  0.754  23
3819  14.4  14.5  13.5  0.798  124
3821  10.9  14.0  18.3  0.786  16
3822  13.8  14.0  18.9  0.878  33
3823  14.0  13.6  20.5  0.906  92
3824  11.3  14.7  18.6  0.791  136
3825  13.2  15.1  22.0  0.891  30
3829  14.7  14.6  19.1  0.872  192
3831  15.1  14.8  18.5  0.822  65
3832  13.4  15.3  21.1  0.799  81
3833  18.3  19.0  19.4  0.777  25
3839  15.8  14.9  16.3  0.736  35
3841  14.6  14.6  19.0  0.625  20
3842  14.0  13.6  20.0  0.669  22
3843  18.3  14.1  27.5  0.796  52
3844  16.5  15.2  25.0  0.698  22
3845  2.1  11.1  3.2  0.743  19
3849  20.0  20.0  20.0  0.779  1
3851  12.9  14.8  16.4  0.863  77
3852  14.3  15.2  17.7  0.898  59
3853  19.0  17.6  19.0  0.894  52
3901  12.9  10.8  12.6  0.751  22
3902  17.0  14.1  14.2  0.700  23
3903  20.0  15.0  19.5  0.615  22
3909  17.8  14.5  19.5  0.723  97
mean  13.9  11.6  14.3  0.676  53
stdev  4.3  4.4  5.7  0.244  79
32ISIC  4-digit  classification
ISIC  Description
3111  Slaughtering,  preparing  and  preserving  meat
3112  Manufacture  of  dairy  products
3113  Canning  and  preserving  of  fruits  and  vegetables
3114  Canning,  preserving  and  processing  of  fish,  crustacea  and  similar  foods
3115  Manufacture  of  vegetable  and  animal  oils  and  fats
3116  Grain  mill  products
3117  Manufacture  of  bakery  products
3118  Sugar  factories  and  refineries
3119  Manufacture  of  cocoa,  chocolate  and  sugar  confectionery
3121  Manufacture  of  food  products  not  elsewhere  classified
3122  Manufacture  of  prepared  animal  feeds
3131  Distilling,  rectifying  and  blending  spirits
3132  Wine  industries
3133  Malt  liquors  and  malt
3134  Soft  drinks  and  carbonated  waters  industries
3140  Tobacco  manufactures
3211  Spinning,  weaving  and  finishing  textiles
3212  Manufacture  of  made-up  textile  goods  except  wearing  apparel
3213  Knitting  mills
3214  Manufacture  of  carpets  and  rugs
3215  Cordage,  rope  and  twine  industries
3219  Manufacture  of  textiles  not  elsewhere  classified
3220  Manufacture  of  wearing  apparel,  except  footwear
3231  Tanneries  and  leather  finishing
3233  Manufacture  of  products  of  leather,  except  footwear  and  wearing  apparel
3240  Manufacture  of  footwear
3311  Sawmills,  planing  and  other  woods
3312  Manufacture  of  wooden  and  cane  containers
3319  Manufacture  of  wood  and  cork  products  not  elsewhere  classified
3320  Manufacture  of  furniture
3411  Manufacture  of  pulp,  paper  and  paperboard
3412  Manufacture  of  containers  and  boxes  of  paper  and  paperboard
3419  Manufacture  of  pulp,  paper  and  paperboard  articles  not  elsewhere  classified
3420  Printing,  publishing  and  allied  industries
3511  Manufacture  of  basic  industrial  chemicals  except  fertilizers
3512  Manufacture  of  fertilizers  and  pesticides
3513  Manufacture  of  synthetic  resins,  plastic  materials  and  man-made  fibers  except  glass
3521  Manufacture  of  paints,  varnishes  and  lacquers
3522  Manufacture  of  drugs  and  medicines
3523  Manufacture  of  soap  and  cleaning  preparations,  perfumes,  cosmetics  and  other  toilet  preparations
3529  Manufacture  of  chemical  products  not  elsewhere  classified
3530  Petroleum  refineries
3540  Manufacture  of  miscellaneous  products  of  petroleum  and  coal
3551  Tyre  and  tube  industries
3559  Manufacture  of  rubber  products  not  elsewhere  classified
3560  Manufacture  of  plastic  products  not  elsewhere  classified
3610  Manufacture  of  pottery,  china  and  earthenware
3620  Manufacture  of  glass  and  glass  products
3691  Manufacture  of  structural  clay  products
3692  Manufacture  of  cement,  lime  and  plaster
3699  Manufacture  of  non-metallic  mineral  products  not  elsewhere  classified
3710  Iron  and  steel  basic  industries
3720  Non-ferrous  metal  basic  industries
3811  Manufacture  of  cutlery,  hand  tools  and  general  hardware
3812  Manufacture  of  furniture  and  fixtures  primarily  of  metal
3813  Manufacture  of  structural  metal  products
3819  Manufacture  of  fabricated  metal  products  except  machinery  and  equipment  not  elsewhere  classified
3821  Manufacture  of  engines  and  turbines
3822  Manufacture  of  agricultural  machinery  and  equipment
3823  Manufacture  of  metal  and  wood  working  machinery
3824  Manufacture  of  special  industrial  machinery  and  equipment  except  metal  and  wood  working  machinery
3825  Manufacture  of  office,  computing  and  accounting  machinery
3829  Machinery  and  equipment  except  electrical,  not  elsewhere  classified
3831  Manufacture  of  electrical  industrial  machinery  and  apparatus
3832  Manufacture  of  radio,  television  and  communication  equipment  and  apparatus
3833  Manufacture  of  electrical  appliances  and  housewares
3839  Manufacture  of  electrical  apparatus  and  supplies  not  elsewhere  classified
3841  Ship  building  and  repairing
3842  Manufacture  of  railroad  equipment
3843  Manufacture  of  motor  vehicles
3844  Manufacture  of  motorcycles  and  bicycles
3845  Manufacture  of  aircraft
3849  Manufacture  of  transport  equipment  not  elsewhere  classified
3851  Manufacture  of  professional  and  scientific,  and  measuring  and  controlling  equipment,  not  elsewhere  classified
3852  Manufacture  of  photographic  and  optical  goods
3853  Manufacture  of  watches  and  clocks
3901  Manufacture  of  jewelry  and  related  articles
3902  Manufacture  of  musical  instruments
3903  Manufacture  of  sporting  and  athletic  goods
3909  Manufacturing  industries  not  elsewhere  classified
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